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This Trade Policy Brief is based on a seminar given by Mike Gifford for the Centre for Trade 
Policy and Law, Carleton University, Ottawa and on the authors paper published in the November 
2005 issue of Policy Options (http://www.irpp.org/po/index.htm).  The CATPRN is funded by 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada but the views expressed in this paper are those of the authors 
and should not be attributed to the funding agencies.   
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1.0 Background 
 
Let me start by explaining why I decided to write a paper on whether Canada’s supply 
managed dairy industry can survive the more open and less distorted international 
trading environment which is expected to emerge from the current round of WTO 
negotiations.  
 
•  My first concern is that while there are only a few weeks left before the Hong 
Kong WTO ministerial meeting, (which is expected to decide on how and by how 
much agricultural trade barriers and distortions are to be reduced), there is, as 
yet, no meaningful public discussion on how Canada’s supply managed dairy, 
poultry and egg industries are going to adjust to a Doha Round result which will 
inevitably involve a reduction in Canada’s over quota tariffs. 
 
•  My second concern is that the supply managed sectors have backed the federal 
government into an impossible corner by insisting that any reduction in the over 
quota tariffs will inevitably mean the end of supply management and the 
government should therefore walk away from the negotiations if over quota tariffs 
are to be reduced. This position ignores the interests of the 75 percent of 
Canadian agriculture which is not supply managed and the rest of the economy 
which have important stakes in a successful Doha Round result. 
 
•  My third concern is that Canadian negotiators will be unable to effectively pursue 
Canada’s agricultural trade interests if they are forced to take untenable positions 
which results in Canada being marginalized as the negotiations enter their most 
critical phase.  It is important to note that I say this as a former trade negotiator. 
 
I should emphasize at the outset that I recognize that supply management is a policy 
which is supported by all of the major political parties in Canada. Given this reality I am 
not concerned about whether there are better alternative marketing systems. My only 
concern is to stimulate a debate on whether, and if so how,  supply management can 
adapt to a Doha Round outcome which is increasingly  likely  to result  in the elimination 
of export subsidies,  achieve substantial reductions in trade distorting domestic support 
and substantially increase market access for all commodities. I repeat - all commodities. 
 
2.0 Supply Management in Canada 
 
I focus on the dairy sector because it is the largest and most politically sensitive supply 
managed sector, given that over 80 percent of the dairy farms are located in Quebec 
and Ontario. It is also the supply managed sector which potentially faces the most 
significant changes to the status quo, as I will explain later. 
 
The current supply management system emerged from a situation in the 1960’s of 
chronically depressed prices and highly distorted international markets. It is often 
forgotten that, prior to supply management, Canada was a net dairy exporter. However, 
as world markets began to close and export subsidies became the norm, a national 
consensus emerged that it was best to circle the wagons and concentrate henceforth on 
servicing the domestic market by matching supply with identified demand. This was 
achieved through the delegation of federal and provincial powers which permitted 
provincial milk marketing boards to control production, pricing and marketing on the 
basis of individual farm production quotas and single desk selling.  Currently, the federal   3
government underpins the system by maintaining support prices for butter and skim milk 
powder and providing import protection through a system of tariff rate quotas. Because 
the over quota tariffs are prohibitively high, the import system acts as an import quota, 
with the permitted import volumes entering over low tariffs.  Within quota imports are 
equivalent to about 3 percent of consumption – roughly the same access as provided by 
the European Union and the United States. 
 
You will recall that in the Uruguay Round all agricultural import quotas, variable import 
levies and other similar non-tariff measures were required to be converted to tariffs.   
There was also a requirement to provide access for a specified volume at low tariffs and 
to reduce the protective over quota tariffs by a minimum of 15 percent. The end result 
was the current system of tariff rate quotas. 
 
3.0 The Doha Development Agenda 
 
The Uruguay Round architecture of tackling agricultural trade reform through the three 
interrelated pillars of market access, domestic support and export assistance is being 
replicated in the Doha Round negotiations. It is already clear that very substantial results 
are on the table for export assistance and domestic support. Less clear, is how and by 
how much market access will be improved. However, even in this most difficult part of 
the negotiations, it is possible to discern the likely negotiating approaches and to get 
some idea of the probable order of magnitudes. 
 
At this juncture there is already clear evidence that the final Doha Round result will 
include the elimination of export subsidies and improved disciplines on export credits 
and food aid. It also appears evident that there will be substantial reductions in trade 
distorting domestic support, likely in the order of 60 percent or more, with product 
specific caps on the most trade distorting forms of domestic support. 
 
While more speculative, it is also possible to suggest what a market access result will 
include. Tariffs over 100 percent will face the deepest formula cuts, perhaps 60 percent 
or more, and there appears to be growing support for a tariff cap in the order of 100 
percent. However, it is accepted that a small number of self-designated “sensitive” 
products will be excluded from the general tariff formula and countries will have the 
option of a smaller reduction in the over quota tariff in exchange for a proportional 
increase in the size of the within quota volumes for these commodities. However, even 
the most sensitive products will be required to make a minimum reduction in over quota 
tariffs.  Given that most Canadian dairy tariffs are in the 200-300 percent range there 
appears little doubt that Canada will choose to designate these tariffs as sensitive. 
 
I have assumed for illustrative purposes that the minimum reduction on the over quota 
tariff of a sensitive commodity will be one-third and that tariff rate quotas will have to be 
expanded in proportion to the deviation from the formula tariff reduction. This suggests 
that Canada will end-up having to provide market access equivalent to 7-10 percent of 
consumption, as compared to about 3 percent to-day.  However, when you add the fact 
that Canada will also face the loss of most of its dairy exports because of the phased 
elimination of export subsidies, then it becomes clear that imports are more likely to be 
closer to 10 rather than 7 percent of consumption. 
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4.0 Implications of the Doha Round for Canada’s Dairy Industry 
 
What then are the implications for the Canadian dairy industry of a Doha Round result 
which approximates the scenario just described?  The main positive impact will be the 
upward pressure on world prices resulting from the global increase in dairy access, the 
elimination of export subsidies and the capping of the most trade distorting forms of 
domestic support. These price strengthening effects will reinforce an already relatively 
firm market price forecast for the next decade that was recently prepared on a joint basis 
by the OECD and FAO. This market strength is mainly attributed to continued strong 
demand growth in the developing countries. 
 
I have already referred to some of the main negative effects of a potential Doha Round 
agreement. To repeat, these include: 1) the loss of nearly all Canadian dairy exports 
made from Canadian milk as export subsidies are phased-out; 2) if there is a cap on 
product specific trade distorting support, Canada will not be able to continue to increase 
support prices in line with cost of production increases or for other reasons; and 3) 
Canada’s share of the domestic market will decline to around 90 percent of consumption 
as imports increase and exports decline. This will affect dairy processors as well as milk 
producers. 
 
Some of the more clear-cut effects arising out of the likely Doha Round results have 
already been described but less clear are the impacts on Canadian market prices and on 
the value of production quotas.  Our best judgment is that while domestic milk prices will 
not be able to increase for the foreseeable future, it should be possible to maintain 
prices around current levels.  The main reason for believing that prices will not fall 
drastically is the fact that even with a reduction of one-third in current over quota tariffs 
and assuming a 90 cent Canadian dollar imports would still not undercut current 
Canadian support price levels for butter. This view is based on my analysis of domestic 
and import prices given a relatively firm international price outlook.  A substantial Doha 
Round result would only reinforce what is already forecast to be a demand driven 
international market. 
 
If what I have described is agreed to be a reasonable scenario, what then are the 
adjustment options available to the Canadian dairy industry?  A reduction in domestic 
market share and loss of most exports will necessitate a corresponding reduction in 
production quotas which could be achieved by a government mandated pro rata 
reduction in individual production quotas or through some form of voluntary quota buy-
back program. Presumably the producers most likely to take advantage of a quota buy-
back program would be the higher cost producers and those who are already thinking of 
retirement.  Any national production quota reduction program would require delicate 
negotiations between the federal and provincial government because quota is created 
and defined by the provinces, not the federal government. 
 
As explained earlier, there is little likelihood that the Canadian Dairy Commission will be 
able to continue to increase support prices. Therefore, in the future, milk prices will likely 
have to be determined by negotiations between the provincial milk marketing boards and 
dairy processors. This would parallel the pricing arrangement already in place for 
chickens and turkeys. There would appear to be no reason why the current system of 
end-use pricing could not continue under a negotiated price regime. 
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The effect of a phased implementation of the Doha Round results, over 5-10 years, on 
the value of dairy production quotas is difficult to quantify. Much will depend on how 
surplus quota is removed, the level of negotiated prices and the assurances the federal 
and provincial governments provide about the future of supply management.  Currently 
the value of dairy production quotas is estimated to be in excess of $20 billion. Put 
another way it now costs a dairy farmer in excess of $25,000 to buy the quota for one 
cow and it typically takes 8-10 years to pay back any bank loan. Given the amounts at 
stake, there is little doubt that the main concern of any dairy producer is the potential 
impact of the Doha Round results on quota values. 
 
Production quota values reflect the capitalized value of the benefits of the current supply 
management system. Much of the increase in quota values reflects the reality of more 
efficient producers wanting to buy more quota to achieve economies of scale. These 
pressures will continue even if market prices remain stagnant or decline somewhat.  It 
appears evident that the uncertainty regarding future production quota values is an issue 
which must be directly addressed in any adjustment package. In this regard, it is 
interesting how the European Union Commission is proposing to reform its sugar policy. 
These reforms would reduce support prices by 39 percent over two years and 
compensate producers for 60 percent of the price cut by providing decoupled direct 
income payments. Sugar production quotas would continue until at least 2014-2015. I 
am not suggesting that Canada should copy the specifics of the European Union 
approach; instead I suggest that a clear plan and guarantees about the future of supply 
controls should go a long way towards preventing precipitous declines in quota values in 
a Canadian context. 
 
There is nothing in the anticipated results of the Doha Round which would prevent the 
continuation of single desk marketing. It is understandable why in a negotiated price 
scenario dairy farmers would want to continue to market collectively when dealing with a 
handful of dairy processors (three firm’s purchase 70 percent of the milk in Canada). 
 
So far our analysis has concentrated on the implications for dairy farmers. However, any 
adjustment package must also address the impacts on the dairy processor and food 
processing sectors. Clearly, the loss of export markets and a reduced domestic market 
share will impact negatively. At a minimum it would appear necessary to ensure that the 
existing import for processing and re-export program continue and that food processors 
who must compete with duty free imports from the United States continue to have 
access to imported ingredients at competitive prices. 
 
What should an adjustment package look like?  The following elements could be 
considered: 
 
•  A voluntary production quota buy-back program, possibly operated on a bid-
basis whereby individual producers are invited to indicate at what price they 
would be willing to sell their quota to the government(s). If a voluntary buy-
back program was deemed to be too expensive then a mandatory pro-rata 
quota reduction accompanied by a one-time compensation payment would 
appear to be the main alternative. 
 
•  Assurance that the production quota system would continue for at least the 
next 10 years. 
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•  Continued access to any national direct income stabilization program, given 
that negotiated pricing could result in more income variability. 
 
•  A program to guarantee outstanding loans used to purchase production 
quota. 
 
•  Assurance that during the implementation period emergency import 
safeguards will be triggered if the over-quota tariffs do not prevent imports. 
 
•  Assurance that dairy and other food processors will continue to have 
unrestricted access to imported milk and dairy products used to manufacture 




In conclusion, I contend that it is possible for Canada to agree to something more than 
an insignificant reduction in over quota tariffs without destroying the fundamental 
elements that are common to all supply managed sectors, i.e. production controls and 
single desk marketing. I further suggest that it should be possible to develop an 
adjustment package which will facilitate a smooth adoption of the likely Doha Round 
results. 
 
Unfortunately, there is a real risk that the dairy farmer leadership will prefer, as they did 
in the Uruguay Round, to delay until the very last moment acknowledging the realities of 
the negotiations. This would be very unfortunate. Delaying discussion of how to adapt   
until after the end of negotiations in late 2006 or early 2007 will only make any 
necessary changes more difficult and more costly. Delay will marginalize Canada from 
the end-game decisions as the negotiations draw to a close. The inevitable price of 
being the last country to join a consensus is having little or no influence in putting the 
final package together. For medium sized and smaller countries being the last to get on-
board usually means having to accept with little, or more likely no change what others 
have already negotiated. Accommodations are much easier to negotiate when a country 
signals earlier in the negotiations that it is prepared to be part of the solution. When the 
overall package is clearly in the interest of the holdout country, it is very difficult to 
credibly argue that walking away from the negotiation is a real option. 
 
The politics of supply management in Canada are extraordinarily sensitive, but no more 
so than the politics faced by others for their sensitive products, for example, sugar in the 
United States, sugar and dairy in the European Union, and rice in Japan or Korea. It is 
clear that Canada will have to open its market for sensitive products to the same extent 
as other developed countries – no more, but certainly no less. Canada’s trade and 
agriculture ministers need a viable negotiating position in Hong Kong and Canadian 
dairy farmers and processors need some assurances regarding the future of supply 
management and the value of their investments. These imperatives do not need to be 
mutually exclusive but time is fast running out. Stakeholders need to start a dialogue 
now – not 12 months from now. 
 
 
 
 